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Abstract—1 A Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) wiretap channel model is considered. The input is a two-
antenna transmitter, while the outputs are the legitimate receiver
and an eavesdropper, both equipped with multiple antennas. All
channels are assumed to be known. The problem of obtaining the
optimal input covariance matrix that achieves secrecy capacity
subject to a power constraint is addressed, and a closed-form
expression for the secrecy capacity is obtained.
Index Terms—Secrecy capacity, MIMO wiretap channel, phys-
ical layer security
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless physical layer based security approaches present
an alternative to cryptographic approaches. They enhance the
security of a communication system by exploiting the phys-
ical characteristics of the wireless channel. Wyner identified
the secrecy capacity of the single user memoryless wiretap
channel [1]. Later, the Gaussian scalar wiretap channel was
studied in [2]. More recently, the secrecy capacity of the
MIMO wiretap channel under power constraints was analyzed
in [3] and [4], while the same problem under power-covariance
constraints was studied in [5] and [6]. In [7], the case
(nT , nR, nE) = (2, 2, 1) (two transmit antennas, two receive
antennas and one eavesdropper antenna) was analyzed, and it
was shown that under certain assumptions on the channels,
beamforming is optimal. In [8], the (2, 2, 2) case was studied
under equality power constraint and the positive definiteness
assumption H†EHE ≻ 0. However, the solution was not given,
and moreover, it does not show that equality power constraint
is equivalent to the more common inequality power constraint.
In this letter, we study the secrecy capacity for a MIMO
wiretap channel with two transmit antennas and an arbitrary
number of receive and eavesdropper antennas. The main result
is a closed form expression for the capacity, that is obtained
based on the roots of a quadratic and a quartic equation.
Notation - Upper case and lower case bold symbols denote
matrices and vectors, respectively. Superscripts ∗, T and †
denote respectively conjugate, transposition and conjugate
transposition. det(A) and Tr(A) denote the determinant and
trace of the matrix A, respectively. λmax(A) denotes the
largest eigenvalue of the matrix A. A  0 denotes that the
matrix A is Hermitian positive semi-definite, and A ≻ 0
denotes that the matrix A is Hermitian positive definite. |a|
denotes the absolute value of the complex number a. In
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denotes the identity matrix of order n (the subscript is dropped
when the dimension is obvious).
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a MIMO wiretap channel, where the transmitter
is equipped with nT = 2 antennas, while the legitimate
receiver and an eavesdropper have nR and nE antennas,
respectively. The received signals at the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper are respectively given by
yR = HRx+ nR, and yE = HEx+ nE (1)
where HR (nR × 2), HE (nE × 2) are respectively matrices
representing the channel between transmitter and legitimate
receiver, and transmitter and eavesdropper; x is the 2 × 1
transmitted signal vector with zero mean and 2×2 covariance
matrix PQ, where P is the power constraint, Q  0 and
Tr(Q) ≤ 1; nR and nE are Gaussian noise vectors with zero
mean and covariance matrices σ2InR and σ2InE , respectively.
We consider the scenario in which the transmitter has perfect
channel state information (CSI) on HR and HE .
The secrecy capacity for this scenario is [4]
Cs , max
Q0, Tr(Q)≤1
Cs(Q) (2)
where Cs(Q) = log det(I + QSR) − log det(I +QSE) and
SR = ρH
†
RHR, SE = ρH
†
EHE , ρ = P/σ
2
.
Lemma 1: The sufficient and necessary condition for Cs >
0 is that H†RHR−H†EHE has at least a positive eigenvalue.
The proof is simple. Please refer to [9, Lemma 1] for details.
In this paper, we assume that the condition in Lemma 1
holds which ensures Cs > 0 and hence Q⋆ 6= 0.
III. CLOSED FORM SECRECY CAPACITY
The main result of this paper is contained in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Let τ1 be the largest real root (if any) of the
quadratic equation
− τ2q3 + τp3 − q6 = 0. (3)
Let τ2 be the largest real root (if any) of the quartic equation
(−τ2q2 + τp2 − q5)2
− 4(−τ2q1 + τp1 − q4)(−τ2q3 + τp3 − q6) = 0 (4)
such that
0 < − −τ
2
2 q2 + τ2p2 − q5
2(−τ22 q1 + τ2p1 − q4)
< 1. (5)
2Then the secrecy capacity equals
Cs = log
(
max{τ1, τ2}
)
. (6)
The coefficients {pi}, {qj} are given by
p1 = −b∗1b2 − b1b∗2 − (1 + a1)(a2c2 − |b2|2)
− (1 + a2)(a1c1 − |b1|2),
p2 = 2b
∗
1b2 + 2b1b
∗
2 + (1 + a1)(a2 − c2 + a2c2 − |b2|2)
+ (1 + a2)(a1 − c1 + a1c1 − |b1|2),
p3 = (1 + a1)(1 + c2) + (1 + a2)(1 + c1)− b∗1b2 − b1b∗2,
q1 = −a2(c2 + a2c2 − |b2|2),
q2 = a2 − c2 + a22 + |b2|2 + a2(a2c2 − |b2|2),
q3 = 1 + a2 + c2 + a2c2 − |b2|2,
q4 = −a1(c1 + a1c1 − |b1|2),
q5 = a1 − c1 + a21 + |b1|2 + a1(a1c1 − |b1|2),
q6 = 1 + a1 + c1 + a1c1 − |b1|2 (7)
where a1, b1, c1, a2, b2, c2 are entries of SR and SE , i.e.,
SR =
(
a1 b1
b∗1 c1
)
, and SE =
(
a2 b2
b∗2 c2
)
. (8)
Remarks: The quartic equation (4) can be solved by radicals
(closed form) [11, p. 87].
Proof of Theorem 1:
For the proof we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2: Let e1 = [1 0]T . Any 2× 2 matrix Q 6= 0 with
Q  0 and Tr(Q) ≤ 1 can be expressed as
Q = xe1e
†
1 + (1− x)uu† (9)
where x is a real number with 0 ≤ x < 1 and u 6= 0 is a
2× 1 vector with u†u ≤ 1.
Proof: One can write Q = xe1e†1 + (Q− xe1e†1) where x is
chosen to satisfy det(Q− xe1e†1) = 0.
Lemma 3: For vectors c1, c2, c3 and c4, it holds that
det(I+c1c
†
2+c3c
†
4) = (1+c
†
2c1)(1+c
†
4c3)−c†4c1c†2c3. (10)
Proof: Using det(I + AB) = det(I + BA) [10, p. 420], it
holds that det(I+ c1c†2 + c3c
†
4) = det(I+ [c1 c3][c2 c4]
†) =
det(I2 + [c2 c4]
†[c1 c3]) which leads to the desired result.
Since Cs > 0, it holds that Q⋆ 6= 0. From Lemma 2, we
let Q = xe1e†1 + (1 − x)uu† with 0 ≤ x < 1, u†u ≤ 1 and
use Lemma 3 to rewrite Cs(Q) as
Cs(x,u) =
log
(1+xe†1SRe1)(1+(1−x)u†SRu)−(x−x2)|u†SRe1|2
(1+xe†1SEe1)(1+(1−x)u†SEu)−(x−x2)|u†SEe1|2
= log
1+xe†1SRe1+(1−x)u†
(
SR+xdet(SR)e2e
†
2
)
u
1+xe†1SEe1+(1−x)u†
(
SE+xdet(SE)e2e
†
2
)
u
(11)
where e2 = [0 1]T . Here, to obtain (11), we have used the
identity (e†1SRe1)SR − SRe1e†1SR = det(SR)e2e†2. Since
Cs > 0, there exists a solution u⋆ with u⋆†u⋆ = 1. To
see why, assume any solution u⋆ satisfies u⋆†u⋆ < 1. It is
easy to verify that Cs(x⋆,
√
t u⋆) is a monotonic function of
t ∈ [0, 1/(u⋆†u⋆)]. Thus, either t = 0 or t = 1/(u⋆†u⋆)
achieves a larger objective value than t = 1. But this
contradicts the optimality of u⋆. From this result, we write
Cs(x,u) = log
u†G1(x)u
u†G2(x)u
(12)
where G1(x) = (1 + xe†1SRe1)I + (1 − x)(SR +
xdet(SR)e2e
†
2) and G2(x) = (1+xe
†
1SEe1)I+(1−x)(SE+
xdet(SE)e2e
†
2). For fixed x, the optimal u is the unit-norm
eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of the matrix
G2(x)
−1G1(x). The problem becomes
max
x
[
Cs(x) = logλmax
(
G2(x)
−1G1(x)
)] (13)
s.t. 0 ≤ x < 1.
By using the fact that for a 2× 2 matrix B,
λmax(B) =
Tr(B) +
√
(Tr(B))2 − 4 det(B)
2
, (14)
we get (simply finding Tr(G2(x)−1G1(x)) = f1(x)/f2(x)
and det(G2(x)−1G1(x)) = f3(x)/f2(x))
λmax(G2(x)
−1G1(x)) =
f1(x) +
√
(f1(x))2−4f2(x)f3(x)
2f2(x) (15)
where f1(x) = p1x2 + p2x + p3, f2(x) = q1x2 + q2x + q3,
f3(x) = q4x
2+ q5x+ q6, and the coefficients pi’s and qi’s are
given in (7). Since G1(x) ≻ 0 and G2(x) ≻ 0, it holds that
that fi(x) > 0 for 0 ≤ x < 1, i = 1, 2, 3.
From the above result, the problem of (13) becomes
max
x, τ
log τ (16)
s.t. 0 ≤ x < 1, f1(x) +
√
(f1(x))2−4f2(x)f3(x)
2f2(x)
≥ τ
which is equivalent to
max
x, τ
log τ (17)
s.t. 0 ≤ x < 1, and − τ2f2(x) + τf1(x)− f3(x) ≥ 0.
The equivalence of (16) and (17) can be verified as follows.
Firstly, the second constraint in (17) can be rewritten as
(f1(x))
2 − 4f2(x)f3(x) ≥ (2f2(x)τ − f1(x))2. (18)
For the optimal τ and x, it holds that 2f2(x)τ − f1(x) ≥ 0.
Otherwise, one can choose τ ′ = f1(x)/f2(x) − τ > τ such
that (τ ′, x) satisfies the constraint (18). But this contradicts
the optimality of τ . With this fact, (18) leads to the second
constraint in (16). Secondly, for the optimal τ and x, the
second constraint in (16) holds with equality which leads to
−τ2f2(x) + τf1(x) − f3(x) = 0. The desired result follows.
Next we solve the problem of (17). Denote F (x) =
−τ2f2(x) + τf1(x) − f3(x) which can be rewritten as
F (x) = A1x
2 +B1x+ C1, (19)
where A1 = −τ2q1 + τp1 − q4, B1 = −τ2q2 + τp2 − q5,
and C1 = −τ2q3 + τp3 − q6. One want to find the maximal
τ (denoted as τ⋆) such that there exists at least a x ∈ [0, 1)
3satisfying F (x) ≥ 0. In other words, for τ > τ⋆, there exists
no x ∈ [0, 1) such that F (x) ≥ 0. Since F (x) is a quadratic
function, this fact leads to two possible situations:
1) The optimal x (denoted as x⋆) satisfies 0 < x⋆ < 1, then
A1 6= 0 and x⋆ is the repeated root of F (x) = 0, i.e.,
B21 − 4A1C1 = 0, and 0 < x⋆ = −
B1
2A1
< 1. (20)
In fact, if x⋆ is not the repeated root of F (x) = 0, then
one can find τ = τ⋆ + ǫ with an enough small ǫ > 0
such that there exists a x ∈ [0, 1) satisfying F (x) ≥ 0.
This is because the two different real roots of a quadratic
equation both depend continuously on its coefficients. But
this contradicts the optimality of τ⋆.
2) x⋆ = 0 which leads to C1 = 0.
From the above analysis, one can find τ⋆ by solving C1 = 0
and B21 − 4A1C1 = 0. This completes the proof.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
First, we consider a MIMO wiretap channel in which nT =
2, nR = nE = 3 and
HR =
(
0.7442 + 1.4223i 1.1740 − 1.8109i
−0.5172 + 0.4116i −1.3020 + 0.2417i
1.9755 + 0.4169i −0.7105 + 0.7272i
)
,
HE =
(
−0.4503 + 0.9711i −0.7453 + 1.1555i
−0.7089 + 0.1272i −0.0506 + 0.5835i
−0.1313 − 0.3833i 0.1974 + 0.1632i
)
.
We set ρ = 5dB. The quadratic equation (3) has two real roots
(1.4247, 10.8607), and hence τ1 = 10.8607. The quartic equa-
tion (4) has four roots 19.0710, 13.2768, 3.4529± 1.5230 ×
10−8i, and τ2 = 13.2768 with x = −B1/(2A1) = 0.3189.
Thus, the secrecy capacity is
Cs = log(τ2)/ log(2) = 3.7308 (bits/s/Hz)
which is achieved at x⋆ = 0.3189. The optimal input covari-
ance matrix is
Q⋆ =
(
0.5435 −0.3198 + 0.0164i
−0.3198− 0.0164i 0.4565
)
which has rank two. Fig. 1 plots the secrecy capacity for
different ρ.
Second, we change the previous example to nE = 1 and
HE = [−1.2480 − 0.2893i, 4.6312 + 0.2417i]. It holds that
HE(H
†
RHR)
−1H
†
E > 1 (this is exactly the condition in [7,
Lemma 1]). The quadratic equation (3) has two real roots
0.3453, 20.5293 and hence τ1 = 20.5293. The quartic equation
(4) has four roots 6.8179±2.2258i and 3.7837±4.38×10−8i.
Thus, x⋆ = 0 and hence beamforming is optimal. This is
consistent with the result in [7, Lemma 1]).
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied a Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel in
which there exists a transmitter with two antennas, a legitimate
receiver and an eavesdropper both equipped with multiple
antennas. We derived the the secrecy capacity in closed form.
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Fig. 1. Secrecy capacity for different ρ.
